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In some situations, characterised by dependence and unexpected 
change, third parties are needed. They solve problems in relationships. 
Courts fulfil this need for trilateral governance, which is a fascinating 
but complex process. Third parties offer a miracle product, because they 
can solve most conflicts just by being there. Providing this miracle is 
difficult, though. Courts are notoriously difficult to manage.  
Courts compete among themselves and with countless other third 
parties, from informal tribunals to websites and television shows that 
mobilize the court of public opinion. Courts can learn from both their 
competitors and throughout the competition process. Because their 
traditional procedures lose market share and legitimacy, this learning is 
a requirement.  
In order to innovate, courts need a setting that provides stronger 
incentives and, at the same time, is a safe, open and nurturing 
environment. The view developed by Montesquieu in the 18th century, 
positioning courts as independent enforcers of laws enacted by 







There are two stories about courts. Both of them are good stories. Lawyers love 
the version that independent courts are among the greatest inventions of human 
history. During the 18th century, Montesquieu and his followers told us that 
independent courts are necessary next to the legislative and the executive 
branches of government. In this view, courts should be there to apply the laws 
made by parliaments and to be a check and balance on the government. No 
courts, no mature state. Looking at any object for many years from one angle 
can lead to an obsession. Montesquieu’s enlightened view on courts is no 
exception. His view sometimes leads to an obsessive defence of courts as being 
special, above outside criticism and well funded without much accountability. Or 



















Another, equally valid view is that there are moments in relationships where 
people need a third party. This view has been elaborated by scholars such as 
professor of political science Alec Stone Sweet1. 
 
A third party is the guarantor of good behaviour at home, in rural communities 
and between states. According to Stone Sweet, third party dispute resolution 
always emerges because people need protection and security in their 
relationships.  
 
                                                          





Economist Oliver Williamson2  studied the need for third party governance more 
precisely. He starts from how people build their lives. We all invest in families, 
land, houses and other assets together with other people. In our work, we build 
and learn things that are only useful for a particular task. Investing in assets and 
social capital is great, but it also tends to make you dependent; dependent on 
your husband, your boss, your supplier of goods and services, your business 


















In these situations of dependence, third parties are needed. If the relationship 
breaks down, they can decide who receives compensation for each part of the 
investment. If an unexpected situation arises, they can determine what should 
occur and can determine proper remedies when a party does not perform, 
including punishment. This story makes a court more than merely enforcers of 
law; rather, they become problem solvers in human relationships.  
 
If you take on the point of view that third parties are necessary to make 
relationships work, then you are likely to become obsessed by determining 
whether courts are effective problem solvers. This is my obsession. Courts are 
fascinating and often do wonderful jobs. They can intervene and help us to cope 
with the difficult moments of divorce, a business partnership not working as 
expected, land conflict, accident, fraud, violence and genocide. The figure below 
gives one an impression of the sheer volume of good work courts can do in a 
country such as the Netherlands3.  
 
 
                                                          
2 O. E. Williamson, The economic institutions of capitalism, 1987; O. E. Williamson, 'The Economics of Governance', American 
Economic Review (2005), p. 1-18. 
3 Selected issues. Sources: Geschilbeslechtingsdelta 2009, Veiligheidmonitor 2010, Jaarverslag Vluchtelingenwerk 2010, 2008 
























Below you see the need for third parties in countries such as The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Palestinian Territories or Sierra Leone. Imagine you are at 
school, with three class mates whose family member has been tortured. Four out 
of the 30 children have stories of how their home was looted and burnt down. 
Three have close relatives who have been killed.4 On top of this, your class also 












                                                          





Third parties cannot turn back the clock. They help to sort out what has 
occurred. They listen a lot. They broker and mediate solutions. If sanctions are 
needed, they can decide. They determine how harm should be remedied. In this 
way, third parties contribute to the process of recovery from the most difficult 
moments in life. They restore trust, so that people dare to rely on others again. 
 
Trilateral governance has a fascinating dynamic. The triangle between judge, 
plaintiff and defendant is unstable. It is hard to make it work. Imagine yourself 
at the top of the triangle. On one side you have a plaintiff who really needs the 
judge to intervene. All her hopes are invested in the judge. But the judge has to 
keep a distance. He cannot give every plaintiff and victim what she needs.  
 
Then there is the even more complicated relationship between judge and 
defendant. An accused person does not want to be there in the first place. He will 
be tempted to use delaying tactics and may do anything to prevent the court 
from deciding the case. William Landes and Richard Posner have called this the 
submission problem.5 In order to solve this, the third party needs leverage to 
make the defendant to participate. A third party may create a safe environment, 
so the defendant can talk and may have something to gain from a good solution. 
He can also use negative incentives: a bad reputation. If you do not show up, 
you get a judgment by default against you. Sometimes detention is needed to 
force the defendant to cooperate. So you use your influence. At the same time, 
the defendant should be guaranteed a fair process and a fair outcome.  
 
On the bottom side of the triangle, the judge oversees the process between the 
parties. How they make their points and contribute evidence. He lets the parties 
grow towards a decision, keeping them within the framework of the law. They 
may take part in the decisions themselves. Even in most criminal cases, there is 
now an intensive negotiation between prosecution and accused, supervised by 
the court. Gradually, the triangle grows towards a decision. The judge decides 
the remaining issues, on which the parties cannot work out themselves. Courts 
work best if they really provide trilateral governance. Make the triangle work, not 
merely writing a decision and imposing it on the parties. Solutions work much 
better and are much more appreciated if the parties actively participated in the 
process. The more they negotiate and the less the court decides, the better it is. 
 
And that brings us to the miracle. Judges and other third parties supply an 
incredible product. Just by being there, they can solve 90% of the problems. 
They provide what has been called the shadow of the law. After a car accident, 
claims for damages are settled if the victim and the insurance company can 
predict the outcome if the case reaches the court.   
 
 
                                                          




But this miracle is hard to bring about. It works if both parties believe that the 
other will spend the money and effort to go to court. That makes them 
reasonable in the negotiations. Courts must also put pressure on the 
negotiations, as good courts are a little patient but determined to decide the case 
quickly if necessary. They are prepared to intervene just in time and are 
accessible at reasonable costs for each of the parties.    
 
Courts are also fascinating because they operate in a kind of void. Economists 
and law and development specialists have shown that courts do not have many 
outside incentives to do their job well.6 Judges have to motivate themselves and 
each other, and it is surprising how often they still succeed in delivering good 
services. Other mortals may have customers with clear needs, but a judge has at 
least two customers who usually want different things. Courts are also not 
disciplined top down. By making them independent, Montesquieu and his 
followers removed incentives on courts that could be provided by a big boss who 
wants to get things done. A minister of justice can give courts more or less 
money, but as soon as he asks something in return he will be accused of 
manipulating the independent judiciary. The press is only interested in high 
profile cases: whodunits, celebrities and the ones with ethical dilemmas. Appeal 
courts operate far away from the daily work of judges, only checking whether 
some rules have been observed, but not how the judge interacted in the court 
room or how they made life easy for users of the procedure. In this open space, 
judges have the best job security around. As a result of this lack of direction, 
courts are difficult to manage, as many of you have experienced. Reviews of 
court reform programs and procedural reform continue to show that it is difficult 
to improve courts services.  
 
In his recent book, Francis Fukuyama even tells us that, of all the components of 
states, effective legal institutions are perhaps the most difficult to construct in 
developing countries.7 Courts in developed countries have overcome this stage, 
but struggle with delay, complicated and costly procedures, effectiveness, errors 
in convictions and legitimacy.  
 
                                                          
6 Martin R. Schneider, 'Judicial Career Incentives and Court Performance: An Empirical Study of the German Labour Courts of 
Appeal', European Journal of Law and Economics (2005), p. 127-144; Francisco Cabrillo and Sean Fitzpatrick, The Economics of 
Courts and Litigation, 2008; Richard Messick, 'Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues', The World 
Bank Research Observer (1999), p. 117; Juan Carlos Botero, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and 
Alexander Volokh, 'Judicial Reform', The World Bank Research Observer (2003), p. 61; L. A. Hammergren, Envisioning Reform: 
Improving Judicial Performance in Latin America, 2007; R. Islam, Institutional Reform and the Judiciary: Which Way Forward?, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2003; Ewa Wojkowska and Johanna Cunningham, Justice reform’s new frontier: 
engaging with customary systems to legally empower the poor, in S. Golub (ed.), Legal Empowerment: Practitioners' 
Perspectives, 2010. 





Court procedures do not always look like miracle products. For many conflicts in 
the world, there is still no miracle third party available. Many conflicts that 
should be before courts are still not reaching them. That is why we will now look 
at third parties and governance mechanisms.  
 
To begin, these are my three points of departure: 
 
 Third parties and thus courts will always be there in some form, because 
they are needed in our relationships. 
 
 Courts are fascinating triads, with three rather complicated relationships at 
the sides of the triangle. By being there, they can provide miracles. 
 
 Courts are difficult to run. Each party wants something else, and judges are 








Now consider the following situations: 
 
 Osama bin Laden is summarily executed by US marines. A trial in 
Washington, Islamabad or The Hague may or may not have been 
considered. 
 Dominique Straus Kahn loses his job and his reputation within days after 
being arrested and indicted; the court of public opinion renders a judgment 
within a few days. 
 Fines are commonly imposed by government agencies or public prosecutors 
in the form of an administrative sanction. 
 TV shows dealing with consumer complaints have developed models for 
making sellers of products and services comply with laws that protect 
consumers. 
 Separate employment tribunals have been set up to deal with employment 
disputes in the UK, as in many other countries. As of this year, their 
organization has been merged with that of the courts again.  
 Mediators appointed by courts do not only facilitate settlement but regularly 
give (evaluative) opinions on how cases should settle in the US. In a way 
they become a court of first instance, with the court itself as an option of 
appeal. But recently, judges also started doing mediations themselves. In 
the UK and in Canada, judicial mediation is developing rapidly. 
 In the US, only 2% of filed civil cases make it to trial. The number of trials 
went down 60% between the 1980s and 2004; summary judgments 
became much more frequent.  
 Criminal trials before a jury are also extremely rare, the main avenue to 
criminal justice is plea bargaining: a negotiated sentence between 
prosecution and defence. 
 In developing countries, an estimated 80 to 90% of disputes are decided by 
informal justice systems within communities.  
 War crimes have been investigated by truth and reconciliation committees 
in South Africa and at least 19 other countries since the early 1990’s.  
 During the past 15 years, human rights lawyers in Egypt filed many dozens 
of cases involving human rights claims against the government at the 
Egyptian Supreme Court; including several cases arguing for lifting the state 
of emergency; decisions in these cases were postponed again and again by 







If we look at courts from the point of view of Montesquieu, these situations seem 
to demonstrate that the position of courts as a third branch of government is not 
respected. Courts are not used for their intended task within the state and they 
do not receive adequate funding. Informal courts are poor man’s justice, 
necessary because governments do not spend enough on courts. Settlement 
bargaining and mediation are a kind of surrogate for litigation. In each of these 
examples, many legal rules have not been observed. From this perspective, 
killing Osama bin Laden and throwing his remains in the sea is a clear violation 
of the right to access to justice, guaranteed by constitutions and human rights 
treaties. Truth and reconciliation commissions may fulfil a need, but they are not 
really relevant for courts. Criminal courts have to continue to do what courts 
always did: work from an accusation towards a verdict establishing a number of 
years that the defendant should spend in jail.  
 
If we switch to the perspective of courts to one of fulfilling a demand for third 
parties, we see more and different things. Courts lose territory to competitors. 
Consumers will not go to courts for protection, when using the avenue of the 
television show is far more effective. People do not use courts if they can obtain 
access to remedies from informal tribunals in their local community. Whatever 
the precise reasons, President Obama did not choose to bring Bin Laden to trial.  
 
These examples all suggest that customers who need third parties, because they 
seek accountability, vote with their feet. Alternative mechanisms for providing 
access to justice are gaining ground and traditional court procedures tend to lose 
market share.  
 
This is not a one-way process, however. The Hague’s courts receive more cases 
now that more countries are more inclined to cooperate with indictments of 
prominent dictators and generals from war zones. Courts are not passive, as 
they develop new services themselves. For example, English courts reintegrated 
the employment tribunals that were once set up separately.  
 
Some judges and court administrators may be surprised to hear about this 
because they experience high workloads. But research confirms the trend of 





There is an increase in other ways to cope with disputes, including more simple 
interventions by judges.8 High workloads are unlikely to be caused by a 
worldwide increase in conflicts between people.9 The number of divorces, road 
traffic accidents, thefts and people killed by others is more or less constant over 
the years, or decreasing. The number of claims about products and services is 
unlikely to grow faster than the growth of the economy. The most likely 
explanation for increasing workloads is that courts do more work per dispute. 
Indeed, in high stakes litigation, files now seem to contain more pages of 
documents (e-discovery), lawyers pleadings have become longer and court 
hearings take more time than 20 years ago.  
 
There is much to learn from competitors and through the process of competition. 
My examples also suggest on what issues courts compete with other mechanisms 
for accountability. And what is the scope for improvement. If a court would have 
a CEO, and you would be the one in charge, you would probably your research 
and development people to work on the following challenges:  
 Timeliness. The court of public opinion decides within a few days. It may 
wait a few weeks for a court decision that shows what is known and what is 
not yet known, but certainly not many years. How can court interventions 
be delivered just in time? 
 Focus on substantive justice minimizing procedural and bureaucratic issues. 
Why did Presidents Obama and Bush not use courts? It might be that these 
men could not afford the risk that some procedural or legal nicety would 
lead to freeing of terrorists.  
 Costs. If court procedures cost a lot of time and money, and the use of 
courts requires expensive lawyers and experts, they will lose market share. 
How can legal costs be limited?  
 Settlement and plea bargaining. If that is now the main way in which people 
obtain access to justice, making these processes fairer could become a 
priority and a challenge.  
 Truth and reconciliation committees show a need for processes where 
people get informational justice: they want to know what happened, listen 
to different perspectives and do this in a setting that is non-adversarial. 
Why is that and what can be learned from this?  
 Impartiality and independence. Sure, this is a big asset of courts. But 
plaintiffs and other users of courts seem prepared to trade impartiality and 
independence against costs and timeliness. When are they willing to trade, 
and to what extent? 
                                                          
8 Marc Galanter, 'The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts', Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies (2004), p. 459. showing a decline of 60% of the absolute number of civil trials from 1985 to 2002 and 
K. M. Clermont, 'Litigation Realities Redux', Notre Dame L. Rev. (2008), p. 1919. showing this trend is similar in other 
countries.  







 Local justice, in the community, close to the relationships where the 
problems arose in the first place, seems to work.   
 Specific knowledge. Courts compete with specialized tribunals who can deal 
with large numbers of disputes efficiently and quickly.  
 
Competition may be a word you do not like to hear in relation to courts. But for 
those seeking access to justice it generally is a blessing. For victims of large 
scale violence in Kenya it is good not to be dependent on the courts in Nairobi 
but to have the additional option of the ICC in The Hague taking action. 
Consumers would have gotten nowhere without being able to rely on courts, but 
also on television shows, consumer authorities and the odd member of 
parliament. They used these different forums to hold producers accountable for 
the quality of goods and services.  
 
This is called forum shopping, and is frowned upon by some in legal academia.10 
But empirical research by Theodore Eisenberg and Kevin Clermont has shown 
that it is a very normal part of the litigation game. 11 Plaintiffs go to the court 
that will help them best. Defendants try to convince courts not to take cases, 
because another court is more neutral or has more expertise. Opponents of 
forum shopping point to excesses such as Texas courts granting high amounts of 
damages in product liability class actions. Belgian or Spanish judges began to 
pursue heads of state for corruption and mass murder. Was that their business? 
These entrepreneurial judges certainly tried to meet a clear demand for justice; 
as did many of their predecessors. Courts like the Supreme Court of the U.S., the 
Conseil Constitutionnel in France and the European Court of Justice in Luxemburg 
all had moments in which they extended their jurisdiction by interpreting their 
powers broadly. They took more power, because they saw a need for their 
services. 
 
What to think of this? During 2010 and 2011, Hiil developed a method for 
diagnosing the challenges for the legal ordering in the future. Three scenarios 
have been developed for the year 2030: Global Constitution, a Montesquieu kind 
of constitutional order on a global level, Legal Borders, a strong nation state 
scenario, and legal internet.12 According to many speakers at the Law of the 
Future Conference, the most intriguing scenario was the legal internet scenario. 
Here laws made by parliaments and courts compete with all kinds of rules and 
guidelines published by government agencies, by international standard setting 
bodies for banks, accountants, the medical profession and what have you, by 
NGO’s and by informal networks such as the G20 and the Global Compact 
between companies that are serious about human rights and the environment.  
                                                          
10 J. Pauwelyn and L. E. Salles, 'Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals:(Real) Concerns,(Im) Possible Solutions', 
Cornell Int'l LJ (2009), p. 77. 
11 Clermont, 'Litigation Realities Redux'; K. M. Clermont and T. Eisenberg, 'Litigation Realities', Cornell L. Rev. (2002), p. 119..  




The third party forums that provide accountability proliferate in a similar way. 
Even criminal courts feel competition from the court of public opinion, by victims 
starting civil actions, military tribunals during the war on terror, truth and 
reconciliation commissions, local arrangements in cities dealing with drug abuse, 
youth crime and prostitution and by special regimes for criminals with psychiatric 
disorders. For all practical purposes, it is now possible to appeal a decision by a 
criminal court to specialized television shows that will help you to prove your 
innocence after all and to committees of scientists who will review the evidence 
again.  
 
There is a need for rules and there is a need for accountability. In a world where 
many people want to do good and have money there are plenty of social 
entrepreneurs who try to supply accountability. 
 
When I worked on dispute resolution systems, I met hundreds of people who 
tried to set up court like institutions where third parties help to solve conflicts 
and to create accountability. The International Criminal Court itself is perhaps 
the best example of this trend. A big group of NGO’s spotted demand for 
accountability of leaders that played a key role in genocide and ethnic cleansing. 
A demand left unsatisfied by local courts and existing tribunals. So a new third 
party mechanism emerged, serving clients in better ways. It is time to look into 
these innovative processes. 
 
But let us first summarise where we are:  
 Courts set up and run by the state compete with many other third parties.  
 Courts can learn from this competition, which highlights a court’s strengths 
and their weaknesses.   
 In the long run, individuals and groups seeking access to justice will vote 
with their feet. This forum shopping cannot be stopped. Where demand for 
access to justice and for accountability is not satisfied, new third party 
mechanisms will be created by social entrepreneurs. This should be 
welcomed.  






In the long run, third party mechanisms are thus likely to become more 
entrepreneurial and more innovative. Even government sponsored courts will 
have to. If they sit and wait until other mechanisms develop that serve the needs 
of citizens in a better way, they will gradually become less relevant. It is 
essential that courts find ways to cope with higher demand. If the International 
Criminal Court would suddenly get 20 new cases per year, a big budget increase 
is not likely. At The Hague’s cocktail parties, most diplomats expect that the 
current €100 million is probably more or less of a ceiling. What will the court do? 
Refuse the cases? Let the victims wait for years? Or develop an innovative way 
to handle these cases at half of the current costs?  
 
All court leaders and ministers of justice face similar challenges. Let us look at 
two possible responses. Some leaders seem to be overwhelmed. If demand for 
court services increases, they see this as a threat. They may react in a command 
and control manner. They impose production targets on judges, without giving 
them a realistic option to improve and innovate procedures. They ask clients to 
stay away. But what will happen at the end of their planning cycles? Most likely 
their judges got more stressed, making more mistakes, the plaintiffs who needed 
them had to wait longer and the powerful defendants got a better deal. If courts 
are then criticized, their leaders may be still be tempted to urge politicians and 
the press to respect courts.  
 
Another response is to see increased demand as a challenge that courts are 
needed. Court leaders can choose to innovate their way out. One of the most 
interesting findings from the literature on court reform is that courts perform 
better if they handle more cases.13 In many countries, family courts, small claims 
courts and courts dealing with non-violent crime are flooded with cases. But they 
find a way to serve their clients well. More pressure makes them more efficient. 
Seeing more clients also gives courts more information about what is really 
needed. Court fees can increase, not as a barrier, but because clients will be 
happy to pay more for faster services and for solutions that work better.  
 
Innovating their way out is thus an option for court leaders. One interesting 
innovation making its way through courts worldwide is known as ‘hot tubbing.’ 
Often, in an adversarial trial, the experts from both sides are each cross-
examined by the lawyers. This takes long and it is difficult for the neutral judge 
or jury to make sense of the expert evidence in this way. So Australian courts 
(lead by Australian Trade Practices, then the court for competition matters) 
developed the concurrent evidence procedure as of 1998, when it became part of 
the rules of procedure. Both experts make a report.  
                                                          




The reports are exchanged and the experts meet. Together, the experts make a 
bullet-point document with a list of matters upon which they agree and matters 
upon which they disagree. Both experts appear in court together and are sworn 
in. The judge makes an agenda together with the lawyers for a point by point 
discussion, chaired by the judge, of the issues in disagreement. The experts can 
submit their views, but are also encouraged to ask and answer questions of each 
other. The lawyers also may ask questions. In this way, the expert’s opinions are 
fully articulated and tested against a contrary opinion.14 Time and money is 
saved for courts and for the parties. 
 
There are many more of such innovations. In The Hague, we are setting up an 
innovation platform for the justice sector. Supported by the City of The Hague 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, we aim to identify the demand for 
innovation and to showcase the most promising solutions. On our website 
innovatingjustice.com we already collected some interesting experiences of 
innovators.  
 
From the experience of innovators, from the literature on public sector 
innovation, combined with the literature on court reform, it is possible to deduce 
some key points that make courts successful innovators (see below, Data 
sources). Basically, successful innovation requires a bunch of good ideas, 
selection of the most promising ones and dedicated hard work to make a model 
or prototype, implementing and scaling up, and then learning. Let me illustrate 
some of these points briefly. 
 
One issue stands out as a big dilemma for judges. Space for breaking rules is 
necessary. Innovation implies change, and existing norms and practices stand in 
the way of that change. Getting around rules is really difficult in the setting of a 
court. The core of what a judge is trained to do is look for the rules. Even if the 
challenge is that decisions have to be taken faster, judges tend to reflect on the 
rules on quick decisions which their colleagues have formulated before. Then 
they look for a new rule: my fellow judges should decide every case they have 
on their desk within 6 weeks. Or should it be 12 weeks? I have seen this happen 
hundreds of times. Courts think rules and make decisions. They do not have 
formats for gradually improving, experimenting and agreeing on new working 
methods.  
 
First, all these rules have to be pushed aside. Is this dangerous? I would suggest 
that breaking the rules when innovating is not more dangerous for judges than it 
is for architects, doctors or builders of websites. Good professionals know what 
they do. 
                                                          




They use their intuition. They test their ideas rigorously before they apply them. 
















The first Innovating Justice Award was granted in the Peace Palace in June 2011, 
during the Law of the Future conference. A jury headed by Hassane Cisse, 
deputy general counsel of the World Bank, chose a scheme originating from 
Nicaragua. Here a local judge supervises ‘facilitadores judiciales’ in villages that 
are two travel hours away from his court house. The facilitators, elected by the 
community, mediate disputes between neighbours about land, problems between 
husband and wife and fights between young men. They help the judge and the 
police to deal with bigger crimes. This fascinating scheme brings the shadow of 
the law to local communities. It also diminishes the work load of the judge. So he 
now has time to educate the facilitators and to visit the villages on a regular 
basis.  
 
This program builds on the needs of users and on existing conflict resolution 
mechanisms in villages. Bottom up innovation is more likely to be effective. It is 
the customers and the front line of judges and court personnel dealing with those 
who know most.  
 
So this scheme has not been developed at the court headquarters, but deep in 
the countryside. It combined ideas from peace-building, mediation techniques 
and good practices of local governance. Lawyers were involved. But in courts, 
there may be an overdose of people with legal training. For innovation, diversity 
of ideas, backgrounds, perspectives and disciplines is necessary.  
 
The judicial facilitators took 10 years of hard work to develop. But now 
facilitators have been introduced in Guatemala, Paraguay and Panama as well. 
They are an interesting option for any country that faces the challenge of access 
to justice in neighbourhoods. Even in the Netherlands, I know of some areas of 
cities where they could make a difference. 
17 
 
The innovation literature recommends working backwards from a clear challenge, 
an outcome goal. Apple wanted a computer screen that you can control with your 
fingers. That became the iPhone. For courts a clear goal could be a process for 
homicide cases with 99% accuracy in establishing who committed the crime + 
high satisfaction with participation in the process for both victims and accused + 
high trust in the way the crime is handled by the public. Inspiring goals always 
sound a bit impossible.  
 
Codifying a new practice too quickly is mentioned in the innovation literature as 
something to avoid. Interviews with judges and countless informal conversations 
confirm that this is a big bottleneck. Judges can be very creative, but they do not 
let this creativity flow. Discussions on better working methods get stuck early on, 
because a group of judges is inclined to codify them immediately. They forget 
innovation is a matter of trial and error, of learning by doing rather than of 
















Selecting good ideas to work on is essential. The literature on judicial reform 
provides guidance here. It recommends simplifying procedures, specialization 
and involving end users so plans for specialized drug courts should have priority 
over general reform of criminal law. If employment tribunals can be developed 
together with employers and trade unions, this is more likely to succeed than 
working with lawyers to redesign the procedures at the Supreme Court level.  
 
Behind almost all the innovations on our website there is a clear innovation 
champion. A person who is very determined to make it happen. One who gets 
the exposure and the credits if he or she succeeds. Are we sure innovators in 





Other innovations described on our website show what the future of courts may 
look like. eBay and PayPal have constructed an online platform for solving 
disputes between buyers and sellers. Complaints about payments and about the 
quality of goods are discussed between the buyer and seller on line. They are 
guided by online formats. The forms where they can enter their contribution on 
line are designed in such a way that they stick to facts and that escalation is 
prevented. On their path through the system, the parties see suggestions how 
others solved similar issues and which rules of the game eBay has provided for 
trade on its platform. Buyers and sellers have powerful incentives to solve the 
issue, because an unresolved issue is shown on their profile. Sellers with many 
unresolved issues with their customers will have a harder time to sell their 
goods.  
 
It is interesting to note that eBay needed such a forum. Without a credible 
dispute resolution mechanism, its platform would attract fewer users. So there 
were many incentives to get this done quickly and effectively. Regarding scaling 
up: this online platform now deals with 60 million issues between buyers and 
















If we conduct workshops in which we let a diverse group of people brainstorm 
about a court of the future, they do not design a building with a court room 
anymore. They tend to end up with a website, on which the parties can exchange 
their views, add evidence, answer questions, find relevant information and 
interact. When they get stuck, a third party comes forward. A judge then helps 
them communicate, organizes a meeting and collects more evidence. Gradually, 
the parties and the judge grow towards an outcome. Most issues are decided by 
the parties. But the judge is there to decide the remaining issues, entering his 





One of the major challenges is to improve the incentives for courts to invest in 
innovation. A major step to achieve this can be the development of a sound 
model for financing and monitoring the performance of courts. Courts perform 
better if they are paid for specific interventions and by the ones who use their 
services (‘pay as you go’). Both complainants and defendants can contribute to 
their costs, although there will be situations where the parties will need a subsidy 
in order to cover the costs of litigation. But financing courts is more complicated, 
because courts also produce guidelines and rules (precedents) which can be 
helpful in order to settle future cases. They should be rewarded for this as well. 
















Innovation is a continuing process, where learning takes place real time. So if a 
procedure does not work, it should be within the power of the court to adjust it 
the next day. This assumes that it is possible to establish what works better and 
what does not work as well. In the context of courts, that is a complicated issue. 
Judges lack feed-back about their interventions. This is starting to change. 
Courts now survey customers. HiiL and my research group Tisco jointly 
developed a method in which it is possible to measure whether the users of 
courts perceived the procedures and outcomes as fair, letting them give ratings 
on seven dimensions of justice and three dimensions of costs. It is an innovation 
in itself, which can be found on innovatingjustice.com.    
 
This list of 27 factors that contribute to innovation may seem too long, too 
intimidating to work on. But this is what research says. There are no magic 






Is there a bottom line in these 27 factors? It may be that judges need a climate 
for innovation with incentives, where they are exposed to competition, where 
they are bombarded with high impact ideas from many different directions and 
where they are closely connected to what users really need. But innovation also 
requires a setting where potential innovators feel welcome. A place where their 
ideas will be nurtured and fed. They need a place with time, incubating space, 
the possibility to break the rules, the option to develop a prototype, some initial 
funding and personal recognition for the hard work of developing a high impact 
innovation.  
 
With our Innovating Justice platform we try to contribute to such a setting, which 
is both challenging and safe. We also believe that The Hague can be a prominent 
place where innovation in the court sector and the broader sector of third party 
dispute resolution justice can be stimulated. An inspiring vision for courts, 
serving the needs of citizens and governments in an innovative way, can be 
formulated in The Hague with appropriate authority. In The Hague, judges from 
many cultures and countries provide a diversity of views. Dutch universities rank 
high in interdisciplinary legal research, so a broad range of perspectives is 
available. New courts have been set up on a regular basis. Incubating space can 
be created. A lab for court innovation does not require expensive machinery or 
materials. The practice of working with models and prototypes can be learned. 
New approaches can be tested in moot courts and in other experimental settings 









It is time to conclude. What can a minister of justice or an entrepreneurial CEO 
of court do if he or she wants to create a setting for great courts?  
 
 Remember people need trilateral governance in their most difficult 
moments. Judges are professionals, relationship doctors and miracle 
providers rather than production workers. 
 
 Allow, no push, judges to break rules and to develop new working 
methods. Let them focus on what works and what is fair, informed by 
rules, not bound by rules. 
 
 Provide more incentives and a sound system for financing courts. Create 
competition and choice, terms of reference, use surveys of participants, 
monitoring whether interventions work.   
 
 Create space for judges; give them 10% of time, 3% of the budget, 
recognition, partnerships with customers and outsiders.  
 
 Invite judges to an open, nurturing, knowledgeable, competitive 



















Data Sources and Further Reading 
 
In this essay, I did not substantiate every claim made with extensive references 
in footnotes, but only the most salient ones. The data on which I relied are the 
following:  
 
 Empirical research on court performance, on the way they deal with 
disputes as reported in legal needs studies and on justice experiences of 
users of courts.15 
 
 Literature on court reform and dispute system design.16 
 
 The challenges identified through scenario analysis at the Hiil’s Law of the 
future forum.17 
 
 Innovations that described on the innovating justice platform and analysis 
of this type of innovation through the lens of the literature on public sector 
innovation.18 
 
 Interviews with a selected group of court leaders and hundreds of 
interactions with judges during many projects. 
 
 My own experience as a lawyer at the Dutch Supreme Court, followed by 
one book and many articles on this particular court.19  
                                                          
15 Courts now increasingly publish the results of user satisfaction surveys. Since the 1970’s, legal need surveys have been 
conducted in over 40 countries. Since Dame Hazel Genn and Sarah Beinart, Paths to Justice. What people do and think about 
going to law?, 1999. they are becoming a routine way to assess the landscape of legal problems and the way they are 
processed. Hiil and Tisco jointly developed a method to assess the experiences of users of dispute resolution procedures, see 
Martin Gramatikov, Maurits Barendrecht & Jin Ho Verdonschot , Measuring the Costs and Quality of Paths to Justice: Contours 
of a Methodology, Special Issue: Measuring Rule of Law (ed. Juan Botero et. al.), Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2011, p. 
349-379 and other research papers listed at www.measuringaccesstojustice.com    
16 See note 5 and my own research papers at http://ssrn.com/author=74344  
17 See www.lawofthefuture.org  
18 See the innovations at www.innovatingjustice.com and my research paper Innovation in The Justice Sector: What  Makes it 
Happen?, presented  at the 2011 conference of the International Legal Aid Group, see 
http://www.ilagnet.org/images/docs/helsinki/Session4Paper1.pdf  









The Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law (HiiL) is an international think 
tank on rule of law in a globalising world. We focus on the interaction between legal systems. We 
create actionable knowledge through debates, workshops, conferences, knowledge partnerships, 
action programmes and expert networks. 
Shaping the Law of the Future | HiiL is venturing on a unique and ambitious mission to think 
ahead of the curve about the changing nature of law in the next 20 years. [ www.lawofthefuture.org ] 
Stimulating justice innovations | HiiL is one of the founding partners of Innovating Justice, a 
new platform to improve the rule of law and access to justice. [ www.innovatingjustice.com ] 
Strengthening research | HiiL’s research pursues innovation in five themes, which together 
provide a coherent perspective on the challenges globalisation poses to legal systems. 
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